• Corpus ID: 250144231

Voluntary Information Disclosure in Centralized Matching: Efficiency Gains and Strategic Properties

  title={Voluntary Information Disclosure in Centralized Matching: Efficiency Gains and Strategic Properties},
  author={Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen and Emil Chrisander},
Information frictions can harm the welfare of participants in two-sided matching markets. Consider a centralized admission, where colleges cannot observe students’ preparedness for suc-cess in a particular major or degree program. Colleges choose between using simple, cheap admission criteria, e.g., high school grades as a proxy for preparedness, or screening all applications, which is time-consuming for both students and colleges. To address issues of fairness and welfare, we introduce two… 

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