Voluntary Implementation

  title={Voluntary Implementation},
  author={Matthew O. Jackson and Thomas R. Palfrey},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
We examine Nash implementation when individuals cannot be forced to accept the outcome of a mechanism. Two approaches are studied. The rst approach is static where a state-contingent participation constraint de nes an implicit mapping from rejected outcomes into outcomes that are individually rational. We call this voluntary implementation, and show that the constrained Walrasian correspondence is not voluntarily implementable. The second approach is dynamic where a mechanism is replayed if the… CONTINUE READING

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