Virtual bargaining: a theory of social decision-making

  title={Virtual bargaining: a theory of social decision-making},
  author={Jennifer Misyak and Nick Chater},
  journal={Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences},
  • Jennifer Misyak, N. Chater
  • Published 5 November 2014
  • Economics
  • Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
An essential element of goal-directed decision-making in social contexts is that agents' actions may be mutually interdependent. However, the most well-developed approaches to such strategic interactions, based on the Nash equilibrium concept in game theory, are sometimes too broad and at other times ‘overlook’ good solutions to fundamental social dilemmas and coordination problems. The authors propose a new theory of social decision-making—virtual bargaining—in which individuals decide among a… 

Figures and Tables from this paper

Hypothetical Bargaining and Equilibrium Refinement in Non-Cooperative Games
Virtual bargaining theory suggests that social agents aim to resolve non-cooperative games by identifying the strategy profile(s) which they would agree to play if they could openly bargain. The
Strategic interdependence, hypothetical bargaining, and mutual advantage in non-cooperative games
One of the conceptual limitations of the orthodox game theory is its inability to offer definitive theoretical predictions concerning the outcomes of noncooperative games with multiple rationalizable
Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests
Orthodox game theory is sometimes criticized for its failure to single out intuitively compelling solutions in certain types of interpersonal interactions. The theory of team reasoning provides a
Virtual Bargaining A new Disagreement Point and Interpretation
Virtual bargaining tries to explain why some actions suggested in games by best response reasoning appear unreasonable and why real players often succeed easily in some coordination problems,
Virtual Bargaining as a Formal Account of Tacit Agreements
We provide a theoretical framework for understanding tacit agreements — agreements that are spontaneously understood even if they are not explicitly stated. To examine tacit agreements, we develop a
Reciprocity and the Paradox of Trust in psychological game theory
Team reasoning: Solving the puzzle of coordination
A review of team reasoning and related theories suggests how team reasoning could be incorporated into psychological theories of group identification and social value orientation theory to provide a deeper understanding of these phenomena.
The dual accumulator model of strategic deliberation and decision making.
The dual accumulator model accounts for a variety of behavioral patterns, including limited iterated reasoning, payoff sensitivity, consideration of risk-reward tradeoffs, and salient label effects, and it provides a good quantitative fit to existing behavioral data.
The Paradox of Social Interaction: Shared Intentionality, We-Reasoning, and Virtual Bargaining
Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common understanding of an


  • J. Nash
  • Economics
    Classics in Game Theory
  • 2020
A new treatment is presented of a classical economic problem, one which occurs in many forms, as bargaining, bilateral monopoly, etc. It may also be regarded as a nonzero-sum two-person game. In this
Some Experimental Games
This paper reports the results of six experiments and analyses performed to explore the applicability of the non-constant-sum case of the theories of von Neumann-Morgenstern, and others, to the
A new consequence of Simpson's paradox: stable cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemma from populations of individualistic learners.
In a computer simulation and 4 experiments, the authors show that, apparently paradoxically, when players' choices are correlated by an exogenous factor (here, the cooperativeness of the specific PD chosen), people obtain greater average reinforcement for cooperating, which can sustain cooperation.
Information, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study.
The lower the information content of the message, the greedier the demand x of the proposer, and the modal proposal allocates (almost) all of the cake to X.
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
This article presents an analysis of 35 years of published experiments testing decision making in prisoners' dilemmas. The objective is to begin to reconnect the theory and the evidence of rational
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
People like to help those who are helping them and to hurt those who are hurting them. Outcomes rejecting such motivations are called fairness equilibria. Outcomes are mutual-max when each person
Non-cooperative games
Non-cooperative game models are described and game theoretic solution concepts are discussed, as well as refinements and relaxations of rationalizability and correlated equilibria.
A choice for ‘me’ or for ‘us’? Using we-reasoning to predict cooperation and coordination in games
Cooperation is the foundation of human social life, but it sometimes requires individuals to choose against their individual self-interest. How then is cooperation sustained? How do we decide when
Interactive team reasoning: A contribution to the theory of co-operation
Abstract This paper describes interactions between agents who sometimes choose as individuals and sometimes as members of teams. Choosing as a member of a team entails not only being motivated by the
A basic problem in the theory of noncooperative games is the following: which Nash equilibria are strategically stable, i.e. self-enforcing, and does every game have a strategically stable