Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science

  title={Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science},
  author={William C. Mitchell},
  journal={Public Choice},
  • W. Mitchell
  • Published 1 February 1988
  • Political Science
  • Public Choice
Although the birth of public choice is frequently identified with the publication of Black's 1948 article on the rationale of group decision-making and Arrow's better-known book of 1951, public choice acquired an identity only with the publication of Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) and assurance of continued existence with the printing of Buchanan and Tullock's The Calculus of Consent (1962), and Riker's Theory of Political Coalitions (1962) but a few months later. Black's article… Expand
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