Veto player theory and reform making in Western Europe

  title={Veto player theory and reform making in Western Europe},
  author={Mariyana Angelova and Hanna B{\"a}ck and Wolfgang C. M{\"u}ller and Daniel Strobl},
  journal={European Journal of Political Research},
  pages={282 - 307}
Abstract Veto player theory generates predictions about governments’ capacity for policy change. Due to the difficulty of identifying significant laws needed to change the policy status quo, evidence about governments’ ability to change policy has been mostly provided for a limited number of reforms and single‐country studies. To evaluate the predictive power of veto player theory for policy making across time, policy areas and countries, a dataset was gathered that incorporates about 5,600… 

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