Veto Points, Veto Players, and International Trade Policy

@article{Oreilly2005VetoPV,
  title={Veto Points, Veto Players, and International Trade Policy},
  author={Robert F. O'reilly},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  year={2005},
  volume={38},
  pages={652 - 675}
}
Much of the literature on foreign economic policy focuses on the preferences of societal groups to explain policy decisions. Here, however, the author emphasizes the effects of domestic political institutions that intervene between policy demands and policy decisions. The comparative politics literature on social welfare policy argues that states with more veto points and/or veto players are less able to alter preexisting policies. The author applies this argument to trade policy and tests… 

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