Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis

  title={Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis},
  author={George Tsebelis},
  journal={American Political Science Review},
  pages={591 - 608}
  • George Tsebelis
  • Published 1 September 1999
  • Political Science
  • American Political Science Review
This article investigates hypotheses generated by the veto players' theory. The fundamental insight of this theory is that an increase in the number of veto players (for all practical purposes, in parliamentary systems the number of parties in government) and their ideological distance from one another will reduce the ability of both government and parliament to produce significant laws. In addition, the number of significant laws increases with the duration of a government and with an increase… 
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Surviving Without Governing: The Italian Parties in Parliament. By Di Palma Giuseppe. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Pp. xvi + 299. $14.00.)
  • A. Zuckerman
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    American Political Science Review
  • 1978
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