Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference
@article{Cooper2005VerticalAP, title={Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference}, author={J. C. Cooper and Luke M. Froeb and D. O'Brien and M. Vita}, journal={Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy}, year={2005} }
The legality of nonprice vertical practices in the U.S. is determined by their likely competitive effects. An optimal enforcement rule combines evidence with theory to update prior beliefs, and specifies a decision that minimizes the expected loss. Because the welfare effects of vertical practices are theoretically ambiguous, optimal decisions depend heavily on prior beliefs, which should be guided by empirical evidence. Empirically, vertical restraints appear to reduce price and/or increase… CONTINUE READING
Topics from this paper
114 Citations
The Assessment of Agreements for Which Temporary Antitrust Immunity is Sought: Competition Authority's Perspective
- Economics
- 2011
- PDF
Does Antitrust Enforcement in High Tech Markets Benefit Consumers? Stock Price Evidence from FTC v. Intel
- Economics
- 2011
- 8
- PDF
How Do Cartels Use Vertical Restraints? Reflections on Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox
- Economics
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- 2014
- 8
References
SHOWING 1-10 OF 94 REFERENCES
Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Comment
- Economics
- 2004
- 352
- PDF
Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation
- Economics
- The Journal of Law and Economics
- 1991
- 89