Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference

  title={Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference},
  author={J. C. Cooper and Luke M. Froeb and D. O'Brien and M. Vita},
  journal={Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy},
  • J. C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, +1 author M. Vita
  • Published 2005
  • Economics, Computer Science
  • Antitrust: Antitrust Law & Policy
  • The legality of nonprice vertical practices in the U.S. is determined by their likely competitive effects. An optimal enforcement rule combines evidence with theory to update prior beliefs, and specifies a decision that minimizes the expected loss. Because the welfare effects of vertical practices are theoretically ambiguous, optimal decisions depend heavily on prior beliefs, which should be guided by empirical evidence. Empirically, vertical restraints appear to reduce price and/or increase… CONTINUE READING
    114 Citations
    Presumptions and prior odds in merger decision rules
    • PDF
    Antitrust Policy and Vertical Restraints
    • 3
    How Do Cartels Use Vertical Restraints? Reflections on Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox
    • 8
    The Strategic Impact of Voluntary vs. Mandated Vertical Restraints on Exclusion of Rivals
    • 1


    Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy
    • 1,416
    Bilateral control with vertical contracts
    • 202
    • PDF
    Naked Exclusion: Comment
    • 339
    • PDF
    Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation
    • P. Ippolito
    • Economics
    • The Journal of Law and Economics
    • 1991
    • 89