Varieties of Logic

@inproceedings{Shapiro2014VarietiesOL,
  title={Varieties of Logic},
  author={Stewart Shapiro},
  year={2014}
}
Acknowledgements 1. Relativism, pluralism, tolerance 2. Varieties of pluralism and relativism for logic 3. Structure: an eclectic perspective 4. We mean what we say: but what do we mean? 5. Meaning and context 6. Theory and meta-theory logic and meta-logic I: philosophical and foundational studies 7. Theory and meta-theory logic and meta-logic II: meta-theoretic perspective Recap and conclusion References Index 

Logical pluralism and normativity

Abstract We are logical pluralists who hold that the right logic is dependent on the domain of investigation; different logics for different mathematical theories. The purpose of this article is to

Making sense of logical pluralism

Abstract The article is centered on the question of how best to understand the logical pluralism/logical monism debate. A number of suggestions are brought up and rejected on the ground that they

Should pluralists be pluralists about pluralism?

How many correct logics are there? Monists endorse that there is one, pluralists argue for many, and nihilists claim that there are none. Reasoning about these views requires a logic. That is the

The normative problem for logical pluralism

Abstract It is commonly thought that logic, whatever it may be, is normative. While accounting for the normativity of logic is a challenge for any view of logic, in this paper I argue that it is

Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

ABSTRACTThis paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the

Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

ABSTRACT This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the

The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has been Greatly Exaggerated

According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse

Logical Pluralism and Logical Normativity

This paper explores an apparent tension between two widely held views about logic: that logic is normative and that there are multiple equally legitimate logics. The tension is this. If logic is

Against logical generalism

This paper argues that logical generalism, whether monist or pluralist, is wrong, and outlines an account of logical consequence in the absence of general logical principles, which is called logical particularism.

An Objection to Naturalism and Atheism from Logic

: I proffer a success argument for classical logical consequence. I articulate in what sense that notion of consequence should be regarded as the privileged notion for metaphysical inquiry aimed at
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