Varieties of Justification—How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction

  title={Varieties of Justification—How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction},
  author={Marius Backmann},
  journal={Acta Analytica},
The debate about induction is a mess, perhaps only surpassed in its messiness by the debate about free will. There are almost as many different proposed solutions to the problem of induction as there are different formulations of the problem itself. While there seems to be a rather broad consensus that the problem is insoluble, the standards for what would count as a justification, were one available, vary wildly. That is not to say that the different authors who formulated the problem thought… 


Is the Humean defeated by induction?
Many necessitarians about cause and law (Armstrong, What is a law of nature. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983; Mumford, Laws in nature. Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy.
Our initial survey of the problems of induction and explanation is now complete. We have considered some of the forms these problems take, some of the reasons they are so difficult to solve, and some
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms
The Rationality of Induction
Writing on the justification of certain inductive inferences, the author proposes that sometimes induction is justified and that arguments to prove otherwise are not cogent. In the first part he
Conditionalization and observation
I take bayesianism to be the doctrine which maintains that (i) a set of reasonable beliefs can be represented by a probability function defined over sentences or propositions, and that (ii)
Papers in metaphysics and epistemology
Introduction 1. New Work for a theory of universals 2. Putnam's paradox 3. Against structural universals 4. A comment on Armstrong and Forrest 5. Extrinsic properties 6. Defining 'intrinsic' (with
Inference to the best explanation
Lipton argues that an illuminating version of "Inference to the Best Explanation" must rely on the latter notion, and provides a new account of what makes one explanation lovelier than another.
Belief and Will
  • H. R. Marshall
  • Political Science
    The International Journal of Ethics
  • 1899
absolutely right or wrong? because no moral legislation has its basis in pure ethics. But the pertinent questions are: Will prohibitory legislation, if enacted, do harm or good ? Will it educate the
Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility
It is proved that, under independently motivated conditions, conditionalisation is the unique updating rule that maximizes expected epistemic utility.
Inference to the Best Explanation, Dutch Books, and Inaccuracy Minimisation
Bayesians have traditionally taken a dim view of the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), arguing that, if IBE is at variance with Bayes' rule, then it runs afoul of the dynamic Dutch book