Varieties of Justification—How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction

  title={Varieties of Justification—How (Not) to Solve the Problem of Induction},
  author={Marius Backmann},
  journal={Acta Analytica},
The debate about induction is a mess, perhaps only surpassed in its messiness by the debate about free will. There are almost as many different proposed solutions to the problem of induction as there are different formulations of the problem itself. While there seems to be a rather broad consensus that the problem is insoluble, the standards for what would count as a justification, were one available, vary wildly. That is not to say that the different authors who formulated the problem thought… 
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