• Corpus ID: 3697345

Variants of Bleichenbacher's Low-Exponent Attack on PKCS#1 RSA Signatures

@inproceedings{Khn2008VariantsOB,
  title={Variants of Bleichenbacher's Low-Exponent Attack on PKCS\#1 RSA Signatures},
  author={Ulrich K{\"u}hn and Andrei Pyshkin and Erik Tews and Ralf-Philipp Weinmann},
  booktitle={Sicherheit},
  year={2008}
}
We give three variants and improvements of Bleichenbacher’s low-exponent attack from CRYPTO 2006 on PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA signatures. For each of these three variants the fake signature representatives are accepted as valid by a flawed implementation. Our attacks work against much shorter keys as Bleichenbacher’s original attack, i.e. even for usual 1024 bit RSA keys. The first two variants can be used to break a certificate chain for vulnerable implementations, if the CA uses a public exponent of 3… 

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