Vaporware as a Means of Entry Deterrence

@article{Haan2003VaporwareAA,
  title={Vaporware as a Means of Entry Deterrence},
  author={Marco A. Haan},
  journal={Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Industrial Economics},
  year={2003}
}
  • M. Haan
  • Published 1 September 2003
  • Economics
  • Wiley-Blackwell: Journal of Industrial Economics
Firms in the computer industry are often accused of vaporware, the untruthful pre-announcement of a new version of their product. By claiming they have a new product, critics argue, these firms try to deter potential entrants. The paper analyzes this phenomenon. It shows that vaporware is an equilibrium strategy in a signaling game in which the possibility to market a new product is private information. In this model, the possibility of vaporware can hurt consumers, also in the case the… 
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