Value of Information and Prevention in Insurance Markets.

@inproceedings{Fagart2003ValueOI,
  title={Value of Information and Prevention in Insurance Markets.},
  author={Marie-C{\'e}cile Fagart and Nathalie Fombaron},
  year={2003}
}
This paper introduces prevention in a model of insurance and studies the equilibrium of a game, where the agent may by testing acquire an information about his loss probability. We point out that the value of information is a complex concept. Contrary to main papers that define at most two ways of measuring the value of information, five definitions make sense in our setting. This enlargement allows to precise the working mechanisms. 

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