Valuation and Systemic Risk Consequences of Bank Opacity

  title={Valuation and Systemic Risk Consequences of Bank Opacity},
  author={Jeffrey S. Jones and Wayne Y. Lee and Timothy J. Yeager},
  journal={Banking \& Financial Institutions},
We examine the effects of opacity on bank valuation and synchronicity in bank equity returns over the years 2000–2006 prior to the 2007 financial crisis. As expected, investments in opaque assets are more profitable than investments in transparent assets, and taking profitability into account, have larger valuation discounts relative to transparent assets. The valuation discounts on opaque asset investments decline over the 2000–2006 period only to be followed by a sharp reversal in 2007. The… 
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Agency Conflicts and Dividend Persistence
  • Benoit d'Udekem
  • Business, Economics
    Journal of Financial Services Research
  • 2014
Bank dividends are unusually persistent. In a crisis, they exacerbate systemic risk and raise concerns for regulators. Bank managers, however, may keep dividends elevated to mitigate agency conflicts


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