Valuation Uncertainty and Imperfect Introspection in Second-Price Auctions

  title={Valuation Uncertainty and Imperfect Introspection in Second-Price Auctions},
  author={David R. M. Thompson and Kevin Leyton-Brown},
In auction theory, agents are typically presumed to have perfect knowledge of their valuations. In practice, though, they may face barriers to this knowledge due to transaction costs or bounded rationality. Modeling and analyzing such settings has been the focus of much recent work, though a canonical model of such domains has not yet emerged. We begin by proposing a taxonomy of auction models with valuation uncertainty and showing how it categorizes previous work. We then restrict ourselves to… 

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