Vagueness and Truth

@inproceedings{Colyvan2009VaguenessAT,
  title={Vagueness and Truth},
  author={M. Colyvan},
  year={2009}
}
In philosophy of logic and elsewhere, it is generally thought that similar problems should be solved by similar means. This advice is sometimes elevated to the status of a principle: the principle of uniform solution. In this paper I will explore the question of what counts as a similar problem and consider reasons for subscribing to the principle of uniform solution. 1 Introducing the Principle of Uniform Solution It would be very odd to give different responses to two paradoxes depending on… Expand
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It is shown that sorites paradoxes are inclosure paradoxes, that is, they fit the Inclosure Scheme which characterizes the paradoxes of self-reference. Expand
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References

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All the standard paradoxes of self-reference, semantic and set-theoretic, satisfy the Inclosure Schema, and are therefore of a kind. The Principle of Uniform Solution (PUS) counsels: same kind ofExpand
The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness
Both in dealing with the semantic paradoxes and in dealing with vagueness and indeterminacy, there is some temptation to weaken classical logic: in par­ ticular, to restrict the law of excludedExpand
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When one meets the paradoxes of self-reference for the first time, one is struck by the fact that they all appear to be members of a single family, generated by a common underlying principle. Indeed,Expand
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TLDR
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TLDR
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According to Stephen Yablo, the above list generates a liar-like paradox without circularity (see Yablo 1985 and 1993). After all, in contrast with the usual liar paradox, no sentence in the YabloExpand
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Philosophers attracted to (b) are usually attracted to so-called gappy semantics, semantics according to which some sentences are neither true nor false. The most prominent gappy approach isExpand
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This is a defense and extension of Stephen Yablo's claim that self-reference is completely inessential to the liar paradox. An infinite sequence of sentences of the form "None of these subsequentExpand
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