• Corpus ID: 239998340

Vaccination Dilemma in the thermodynamic limit

  title={Vaccination Dilemma in the thermodynamic limit},
  author={M ArjunKrishnanU and Colin Benjamin},
The vaccination game is a social dilemma that refers to the conundrum individuals face (to get immunized or not) when the population is exposed to an infectious disease. The model has recently gained much traction due to the COVID-19 pandemic since the public perception of vaccines plays a significant role in disease dynamics. This paper studies the vaccination game in the thermodynamic limit with an analytical method derived from the 1D Ising model called Nash equilibrium mapping. The… 

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