author={Hans Gersbach},
  journal={Macroeconomic Dynamics},
  pages={656 - 680}
  • H. Gersbach
  • Published 26 January 2011
  • Macroeconomic Dynamics
Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote-buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda… Expand
1 Citations
A Model of Public Choice with Clientelism and Corruption: Introducing the Analytical
This chapter introduces a model of public choice with the purpose of explaining the existing relationship between clientelism, corruption, public expenditure, and the quality of public policy, at theExpand


Vote Buying: General Elections
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game viaExpand
The Real Swing Voter&Apos;S Curse
A key idea in political economy is that policy is often tailored to voters who are not ideologically attached - swing voters. We show, however, that in political environments where political partiesExpand
Elections for Sale: The Causes And Consequences of Vote Buying
Introduction: Why Study Vote Buying? - F.C. Schaffer. What Is Vote Buying? - F.C. Schaffer and A. Schedler. When and How Do Politicians Buy Votes? When Does a Market for Votes Emerge? Historical andExpand
Bargaining in Legislatures
Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure ofExpand
Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries
Evidence from a broad panel of countries shows little overall relation between income inequality and rates of growth and investment. For growth, higher inequality tends to retard growth in poorExpand
Strategic voting in repeated referenda
This paper analyzes learning and voting strategy when a budget maximizing bureaucrat has several chances to obtain referendum approval. The process is modeled as a sequential game with a continuum ofExpand
Endogenous Political Institutions
A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of aExpand
Consolidation of New Democracy, Mass Attitudes, and Clientelism
In many democratic countries, especially those in which democracy is new, democracy is fragile and not fully consolidated, meaning that crucial political groups lack full commitment to the democraticExpand
Income Distribution and Macroeconomics
This paper analyzes the role of income distribution in macroeconomic analysis. The study demonstrates that the long-run equilibrium depends on the initial distribution of income. In accordance withExpand
Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule?
Although almost half of the world's population lives under nondemocratic regimes, the questions of how policy decisions are made and how power changes hands in nondemocracies have received relativelyExpand