Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT GA Coles

Abstract

The incentives and disincentives for countries to go nuclear comprise a combination of military, political, and economic<lb>concerns and motivations. These vary over time for different countries. For countries allied to one of the two nuclear<lb>superpowers, concern about military security is not a predominant factor, while it is the decisive one for the non-nuclear<lb>countries who are not under the nuclear umbrella of a super power and who perceive serious threats to their security. For<lb>countries without acute security problems, the political and economics motivations are the predominant ones and these include<lb>such incentives as strengthening their independence and increasing their status and prestige in the world. The disincentives are<lb>largely political, ranging from effective security guarantees through adequate supplies of conventional armaments to assurances<lb>concerning future supplies of fissile materials. Incentives to go nuclear appear to outweigh the disincentives. Only drastic<lb>measures by the nuclear powers in the way of security assurances, nuclear disarmament, and the creation of a more just political<lb>and economic world order can serve to prevent the emergence of a proliferated world. [2] Meyer S. 1984. The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation. The University of Chicago Press,<lb>Chicago, Illinois. Abstract: Stephen Meyer presents a systematic examination of the underlying determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation.<lb>Looking at the current theories of nuclear proliferation, he asks: Must a nation that acquires the technical capability to<lb>manufacture nuclear weapons eventually do so? In a rigorous and accessible analysis Meyer provides the first empirical,<lb>statistical model explaining why particular countries became nuclear powers when they did. His finding clearly contradict the<lb>notion that the pace of nuclear proliferation is controlled by a technological imperative and shows that political and military<lb>factors account for the past decisions of nations to acquire or forgo development of nuclear weapons. Stephen Meyer presents a systematic examination of the underlying determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation.<lb>Looking at the current theories of nuclear proliferation, he asks: Must a nation that acquires the technical capability to<lb>manufacture nuclear weapons eventually do so? In a rigorous and accessible analysis Meyer provides the first empirical,<lb>statistical model explaining why particular countries became nuclear powers when they did. His finding clearly contradict the<lb>notion that the pace of nuclear proliferation is controlled by a technological imperative and shows that political and military<lb>factors account for the past decisions of nations to acquire or forgo development of nuclear weapons. In contrast, the technological imperative−the motivational hypothesis that Meyer espouses−sees latent capacity as a necessary,<lb>but not sufficient, condition. It assumes some specific politico-military condition is necessary to motivate the proliferation<lb>decision. The motivational aspects are the decision stimuli, decision options, and choice. The motivational basis consists of the<lb>motive factors and dissuasive factors. The actual choice will result from the incentives and disincentives attached to each option. [3] Sagan S. 1997. ―Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb.‖<lb>International Security 21(3):54-86. 1<lb>The abstracts included here with references cited and discussed in this section were taken primarily from<lb>corresponding published abstracts, forewords, or paper or report introductions and other summary materials.<lb>However, this material was typically edited to produce abstracts of similar length and tone.

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Cite this paper

@inproceedings{BROTHERS2010UtilityOS, title={Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT GA Coles}, author={A U BROTHERS and Sharon Marie Thompson and ZN Gastelum}, year={2010} }