Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems

@article{Myerson1981UtilitarianismEA,
  title={Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems},
  author={Roger B. Myerson},
  journal={Econometrica},
  year={1981},
  volume={49},
  pages={883-897}
}
  • R. Myerson
  • Published 1 July 1981
  • Economics
  • Econometrica
Two theorems are derived about social choice functions, which are defined on comprehensive convex subsets of utility allocation space. Theorem 1 asserts that a linearity condition, together with Pareto optimality, implies that a social choice function must be utilitarian. Theorem 2 asserts that a concavity condition, together with Pareto optimality and independence of irrelevant alternatives, implies that a social choice function must be either utilitarian or egalitarian. These linearity and… 

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