Using Game Theory for Los Angeles Airport Security

@article{Pita2009UsingGT,
  title={Using Game Theory for Los Angeles Airport Security},
  author={James Pita and Manish Jain and Fernando Ord{\'o}{\~n}ez and Christopher D. Portway and Milind Tambe and Craig Western and Praveen Paruchuri and Sarit Kraus},
  journal={AI Mag.},
  year={2009},
  volume={30},
  pages={43-57}
}
Security at major locations of economic or political importance is a key concern around the world, particularly given the threat of terrorism. Limited security resources prevent full security coverage at all times, which allows adversaries to observe and exploit patterns in selective patrolling or monitoring, e.g. they can plan an attack avoiding existing patrols. Hence, randomized patrolling or monitoring is important, but randomization must provide distinct weights to different actions based… 

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