Using Game Theory for Los Angeles Airport Security

@article{Pita2009UsingGT,
  title={Using Game Theory for Los Angeles Airport Security},
  author={James Pita and Manish Jain and Fernando Ord{\'o}{\~n}ez and Christopher Portway and Milind Tambe and Craig Western and Praveen Paruchuri and Sarit Kraus},
  journal={AI Mag.},
  year={2009},
  volume={30},
  pages={43-57}
}
n Security at major locations of economic or political impor tance is a key concern around the world, particularly given the threat of terrorism. Limited security resources prevent full security coverage at all times, which allows adversaries to observe and exploit patterns in selective patrolling or mon itoring; for example, they can plan an attack avoiding existing pa trols. Hence, randomized patrolling or monitoring is impor tant, but randomization must provide distinct weights to dif ferent… Expand
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