Using Deferred Compensation to Strengthen the Ethics of Financial Regulation *

  title={Using Deferred Compensation to Strengthen the Ethics of Financial Regulation *},
  author={Edward J Kane and J G Cleary},
Defects in the corporate governance of government-owned enterprises tempt opportunistic officials to breach duties of public stewardship. Corporate-governance theory suggests that incentive-based deferred compensation could intensify the force that common-law duties actually exert on regulatory managers. In principle, a forfeitable fund of deferred compensation could be combined with provisions for measuring, verifying, and rewarding multiperiod performance to make top regulators accountable… CONTINUE READING


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