Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making

@article{Grdenfors2004UnreliablePR,
  title={Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making},
  author={P. G{\"a}rdenfors and N. Sahlin},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2004},
  volume={53},
  pages={361-386}
}
A central part of Bayesianism is the doctrine that the decision maker's knowledge in a given situation can be represented by a subjective probability measure defined over the possible states of the world. This measure can be used to determine the expected utility for the agent of the various alternatives open to him. The basic decision rule is then that the alternative which has the maximal expected utility should be chosen. A fundamental assumption for this strict form of Bayesianism is that… Expand
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