Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences

@article{Halaburda2010UnravellingIT,
  title={Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences},
  author={Hanna Halaburda},
  journal={Games Econ. Behav.},
  year={2010},
  volume={69},
  pages={365-393}
}
This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism that the literature focuses on), unravelling is more likely to occur when participants have more similar preferences. It also shows that any Pareto-optimal mechanism must prevent unravelling, and that the ex-post stable mechanism… Expand
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