Unpacking the Future: A Nudge Toward Wider Subjective Confidence Intervals

@article{Jain2013UnpackingTF,
  title={Unpacking the Future: A Nudge Toward Wider Subjective Confidence Intervals},
  author={Kriti Jain and Kanchan Mukherjee and J. Neil Bearden and Anil Gaba},
  journal={FEN: Behavioral Finance (Topic)},
  year={2013}
}
Subjective probabilistic judgments in forecasting are inevitable in many real-life domains. A common way to obtain such judgments is to assess fractiles or confidence intervals. However, these judgments tend to be systematically overconfident. Further, it has proved particularly difficult to debias such forecasts and improve the calibration. This paper proposes a simple process that systematically leads to wider confidence intervals, thus reducing overconfidence. With a series of experiments… 
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