Unlikelihood of Condorcet’s paradox in a large society

  title={Unlikelihood of Condorcet’s paradox in a large society},
  author={Andranik Tangian},
  journal={Social Choice and Welfare},
  • A. Tangian
  • Published 29 February 2000
  • Economics
  • Social Choice and Welfare
Abstract. We provide intuitive, formal, and computational evidence that in a large society Condorcet’s paradox (the intransitivity of social preference obtained by pairwise vote) can hardly occur. For that purpose, we compare two models of social choice, one based on voting and another one based on summing individual cardinal utilities, expressed either in reals, or integers. We show that in a probabilistic model with a large number of independent individuals both models, almost surely, provide… 

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