Universally Composable Symbolic Security Analysis

  title={Universally Composable Symbolic Security Analysis},
  author={Ran Canetti and Jonathan Herzog},
  journal={Journal of Cryptology},
In light of the growing complexity of cryptographic protocols and applications, it becomes highly desirable to mechanize—and eventually automate—the security analysis of protocols. A natural step towards automation is to allow for symbolic security analysis. However, the complexity of mechanized symbolic analysis is typically exponential in the space and time complexities of the analyzed system. Thus, full automation via direct analysis of the entire given system has so far been impractical… CONTINUE READING
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