Universality of Nash Equilibria

  title={Universality of Nash Equilibria},
  author={Ruchira S. Datta},
  journal={Math. Oper. Res.},
Every real algebraic variety is isomorphic to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some three-person game, and also to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of anN-person game in which each player has two pure strategies. From the Nash-Tognoli Theorem it follows that every compact differentiable manifold can be encoded as the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some game. Moreover, there exist isolated Nash equilibria of arbitrary topological degree. 
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