United for Change: Deliberative Coalition Formation to Change the Status Quo

  title={United for Change: Deliberative Coalition Formation to Change the Status Quo},
  author={Edith Elkind and Davide Grossi and Ehud Y. Shapiro and Nimrod Talmon},
We study a setting in which a community wishes to identify a strongly supported proposal from a large space of alternatives, in order to change the status quo. We describe a deliberation process in which agents dynamically form coalitions around proposals that they prefer over the status quo. We formulate conditions on the space of proposals and on the ways in which coalitions are formed that guarantee deliberation to succeed, that is, to terminate by identifying a proposal with the largest… 

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