Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games

@inproceedings{Govindan1999UniquenessOT,
  title={Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games},
  author={Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson},
  year={1999}
}
A basic problem of game theory is equilibrium selection; that is, identifying those equilibria that satisfy plausible axioms of the sort postulated by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and Mertens (1989), and variants proposed by Banks and Sobel (1987), Cho and Kreps (1987), and others. The main axioms require properties such as Invariance (with respect to addition or deletion of redundant pure strategies), Backwards Induction (subgame perfection), and Admissibility (exclusion of dominated strategies… CONTINUE READING