Corpus ID: 115471567

Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality

@article{Ballantyne2011UniquenessEA,
  title={Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality},
  author={N. Ballantyne and E. Coffman},
  journal={Philosopher's Imprint},
  year={2011},
  volume={11}
}
Roger White [2005] and Richard Feldman ([2003: 185-6] and [2007]) offer arguments for U. A version of EW for all-or-nothing belief is defended by Feldman ([2003], [2006], [2007]), while versions applicable to degreed belief are championed by David Christensen [2007] and Adam Elga [2007]. We shall focus on U. Endorsing it, we’ll argue, commits one to the highly controversial thesis that whatever fixes your rational attitudes can do so only by fixing what evidence you have. This commitment… Expand
43 Citations
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  • Highly Influenced
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  • 25
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