Unions, Bargaining and Strikes

  title={Unions, Bargaining and Strikes},
  author={Peter Cramton and Joseph S. Tracy},
Labor disputes are an intriguing feature of the landscape of industrialized economies. Economists have had a long-standing interest in formulating a framework for understanding and analyzing labor disputes. The development of noncooperative bargaining theory provided the tools for a theory of collective bargaining and labor disputes. A general aim of this theoretical development is to inform policy makers of the efficiency and equity effects associated with different labor laws and institutions… 
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