Corpus ID: 15624887

Unintended Consequences of the Independent Board Requirement on CEO Power

  title={Unintended Consequences of the Independent Board Requirement on CEO Power},
  author={E. Han Kim and Yao Lu},
NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms are required to have a majority of independent directors starting 2004. Since the regulation can weaken CEO influence over the board, affected CEOs may counter it by building a closely aligned team of top executives to strengthen their structural power. Using a differences-indifferences approach, we find that affected CEOs fill their executive suites with significantly higher abnormal fractions of top executives hired or promoted during their tenure, and with… Expand


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