Understanding the research program

  title={Understanding the research program},
  author={Joseph Henrich and Maciej Chudek},
  journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  pages={29 - 30}
Abstract The target article misunderstands the research program it criticizes. The work of Boyd, Richerson, Fehr, Gintis, Bowles and their collaborators has long included the theoretical and empirical study of models both with and without diffuse costly punishment. In triaging the situation, we aim to (1) clarify the theoretical landscape, (2) highlight key points of agreement, and (3) suggest a more productive line of debate. 

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