Understanding the Role of Sender Reputation in Abuse Reporting and Cleanup

  title={Understanding the Role of Sender Reputation in Abuse Reporting and Cleanup},
  author={Orçun Çetin and Mohammad Hanif Jhaveri and Carlos Ga{\~n}{\'a}n and M. Eeten and T. Moore},
  journal={J. Cybersecur.},
  • Orçun Çetin, Mohammad Hanif Jhaveri, +2 authors T. Moore
  • Published 2015
  • Business, Computer Science
  • J. Cybersecur.
  • Motivation: Participants on the front lines of abuse reporting have a variety of options to notify intermediaries and resource owners about abuse of their systems and services. These can include emails to personal messages to blacklists to machine-generated feeds. Recipients of these reports have to voluntarily act on this information. We know remarkably little about the factors that drive higher response rates to abuse reports. One such factor is the reputation of the sender. In this article… CONTINUE READING
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