Understanding of the relationship between seeing and knowing by tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

  title={Understanding of the relationship between seeing and knowing by tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)},
  author={Hika Kuroshima and Kazuo Fujita and Akira Fuyuki and Tsuyuka Masuda},
  journal={Animal Cognition},
Abstract. The ability of four tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) to recognize the causal connection between seeing and knowing was investigated. The subjects were trained to follow a suggestion about the location of hidden food provided by a trainer who knew where the food was (the knower) in preference to a trainer who did not (the guesser). The experimenter baited one of three opaque containers behind a cardboard screen so that the subjects could not see which of the containers hid the… 

A Capuchin monkey (Cebus apella) recognizes when people do and do not know the location of food

The aim of the present study was to specify whether the subjects learned a simple conditional discrimination or a causal relationship that seeing leads to knowing, and to suggest that one capuchin monkey learned to recognize the relationship between seeing and knowing.

How do tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) understand causality involved in tool use?

Four tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were trained to choose from 2 hook-like tools, 1 of which successfully led to collecting food, whereas the other did not because of inappropriate spatial

Learning from others’ mistakes in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

The investigation of whether tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) learn from others’ mistakes suggests that not only humans and apes, but also monkeys may understand the meaning ofOthers’ actions in social learning.

Do capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, know what conspecifics do and do not see?

These experiments provide little support for the hypothesis that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to what another individual does or does not see, and compare the results with those obtained with chimpanzees in the same paradigm and discuss the evolution of primate social cognition.

Inferences about the location of food in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) in two sensory modalities.

The authors tested the ability of capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) to make inferences about hidden food by manipulating empty and filled objects and found that capuchins were capable of inferential reasoning.

Redundant food searches by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): a failure of metacognition?

Capuchin monkeys' behavior contrasts with the efficient employment of visual search behavior reported in humans, apes and macaques, and this difference is consistent with species-related variations in metacognitive abilities, although other explanations are also possible.

I know you are not looking at me: capuchin monkeys’ (Cebus apella) sensitivity to human attentional states

The results suggest that capuchins are sensitive to eye direction but this sensitivity does not lead to differential pointing trained in laboratory experiments, and is the first firm behavioral evidence that non-human primates attend to the subtle states of eyes in a food requesting task.

Visual perspective taking by dogs (Canis familiaris) in a Guesser–Knower task: evidence for a canine theory of mind?

Results add to evidence that dogs have a remarkable sensitivity to cues related to humans’ attentional state, which enables them to respond as if they had a functional theory of mind in the Guesser–Knower task with human informants.

Metamemory in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

  • K. Fujita
  • Psychology, Biology
    Animal Cognition
  • 2009
The metamemory possessed by this new world monkey species may be more like a flag, showing strength of memory trace, than an elaborate representation showing details of the memory trace.

Do squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) predict that looking leads to touching?

Additional evidence is required before concluding that behavior prediction based on gaze cues typifies primates; other approaches for studying how they process attention cues are indicated.



Inferences about guessing and knowing by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

The visual perspective-taking ability of 4 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) was investigated and results are consistent with the hypothesis that chimpanzees are capable of modeling the visual perspectives of others.

Do rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) attribute knowledge and ignorance to others?

None of the macaques provided any evidence that they realized the different states of knowledge possessed by the guesser and knower, consistent with the hypothesis that rhesus macaques are incapable of making inferences about the mental states of others.

Lack of comprehension of cause-effect relations in tool-using capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella).

Four tufted capuchin monkeys, successful in a tool task in which they used a stick to push a reward out of a tube, were tested in a similar task, with a tube with a hole and a small trap, indicating that they did not take into account the effects of their actions on the reward.

Pointing, withholding information, and deception in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella).

Brown capuchin monkeys, like 4-year-old children and human-socialized chimpanzees, showed communicative and deceptive pointing in experiments in which they benefited by indicating, accurately or

Rhesus monkeys fail to use gaze direction as an experimenter-given cue in an object-choice task

Learning and limits of use of eye gaze by capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) in an object-choice task.

The results show that capuchin monkeys can learn to use eye gaze as a discriminative cue, but there was no-evidence for any underlying awareness of eye gazeAs a cue to direction of attention.

Young children's (Homo sapiens) understanding of knowledge formation in themselves and others.

Three- and 4-year-old children (Homo sapiens) were tested for comprehension of knowledge formation, and studies using very similar procedures with chimpanzees and rhesus macaques were measuring an ability (or inability) to understand how knowledge states form.

Performance in a tool-using task by common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), an orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus), and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella).

The results indicate that all these species can solve these tasks, however, only the performance of apes is consistent with emerging comprehension of the causal relations required for the avoidance of errors in the more complex tasks.

A Longitudinal Investigation of Chimpanzees' Understanding of Visual Perception

Seven chimpanzees were tested for their understanding of the intentional aspect of visual perception at 5‐6 years of age and again at 7 years of age. They appeared not to understand that they should

Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?

Abstract An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly