Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition

  title={Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition},
  author={Michael Tomasello and Malinda Carpenter and Josep Call and Tanya Behne and Henrike Moll},
  journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  pages={675 - 691}
We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in… Expand
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  • Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
  • 2008
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