Understanding Conditionalization

  title={Understanding Conditionalization},
  author={Christopher J. G. Meacham},
  journal={Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
  pages={767 - 797}
At the heart of the Bayesianism is a rule, Conditionalization, which tells us how to update our beliefs. Typical formulations of this rule are underspecified. This paper considers how, exactly, this rule should be formulated. It focuses on three issues: when a subject’s evidence is received, whether the rule prescribes sequential or interval updates, and whether the rule is narrow or wide scope. After examining these issues, it argues that there are two distinct and equally viable versions of… 
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