Uncertainty in Mechanism Design

  title={Uncertainty in Mechanism Design},
  author={Giuseppe Lopomo and Luca Rigotti and Chris Shannon},
  journal={ERN: Other Microeconomics: Decision-Making under Risk \& Uncertainty (Topic)},
We consider mechanism design problems with Knightian uncertainty formalized using incomplete preferences, as in Bewley (1986). Without completeness, decision making depends on a set of beliefs, and an action is preferred to another if and only if it has larger expected utility for all beliefs in this set. We consider two natural notions of incentive compatibility in this setting: maximal incentive compatibility requires that no strategy has larger expected utility than reporting truthfully for… 
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    2011 IEEE 52nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
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