Uncertainties Facilitate Aggressive Behavior in a Spatial Hawk-dove Game

@article{Perc2007UncertaintiesFA,
  title={Uncertainties Facilitate Aggressive Behavior in a Spatial Hawk-dove Game},
  author={Matja{\vz} Perc},
  journal={Int. J. Bifurc. Chaos},
  year={2007},
  volume={17},
  pages={4223-4227}
}
  • M. Perc
  • Published 1 November 2007
  • Economics
  • Int. J. Bifurc. Chaos
We study effects of additive spatiotemporal random variations, introduced to the payoffs of a spatial hawk–dove game, on the evolution of the reconciliatory and the aggressive strategy. We show that uncertainties facilitate aggressive behavior for a broad range of resource values. In particular, aggressors thrive best if stochastic influences are of the order of magnitude of deterministic payoff values. We argue that random payoff variations are potent and plausible promoters of aggressive… 

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