Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: The State of the Art

  title={Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: The State of the Art},
  author={J. Neil Bearden},
In the basic ultimatum bargaining game two players, P1 and P2, must divide a pie (π). P1 proposes a division in which he gets π − x and P2 gets x. P2 can then accept the division, in which the π is split according to P1’s proposal, or reject the proposal, in which case neither player gets anything. The current paper reviews empirical research on ultimatum bargaining games. It covers early work starting with Güth et al. (1982), but largely focuses on more recent work (post Roth (1995)). Taken… CONTINUE READING


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