Ukraine and the Art of Limited War

  title={Ukraine and the Art of Limited War},
  author={Lawrence D. Freedman},
  pages={38 - 7}
Putin's power play in Ukraine was impulsive and improvised, without any clear sense of the desired end state. After many months of effort, Russia has achieved limited gains, but at high cost. 
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