USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-based Operations

  title={USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-based Operations},
  author={James N. Mattis},
  journal={The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters},
  • J. Mattis
  • Published 1 August 2008
  • Political Science
  • The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Herein are my thoughts and commander's guidance regarding effects-based operations (EBO). This article is designed to provide the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and among our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my… 

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