Typicality and reasoning fallacies.

@article{Shafir1990TypicalityAR,
  title={Typicality and reasoning fallacies.},
  author={Eldar Shafir and Edward E. Smith and Daniel N. Osherson},
  journal={Memory & cognition},
  year={1990},
  volume={18 3},
  pages={229-39}
}
The work of Tversky and Kahneman on intuitive probability judgment leads to the following prediction: The judged probability that an instance belongs to a category is an increasing function of the typicality of the instance in the category. To test this prediction, subjects in Experiment 1 read a description of a person (e.g., "Linda is 31, bright, ... outspoken") followed by a category. Some subjects rated how typical the person was of the category, while others rated the probability that the… CONTINUE READING

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