Tying your enemy ' s hands in close races : The politics of federal transfers in Brazil

@inproceedings{Brollo2010TyingYE,
  title={Tying your enemy ' s hands in close races : The politics of federal transfers in Brazil},
  author={Fernanda Brollo},
  year={2010}
}
  • Fernanda Brollo
  • Published 2010
Tying Your Enemy’s Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil This paper uses a quasi-experimental strategy to disclose utterly political reasons behind the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We apply a regression discontinuity design in close elections to identify the effect of political alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil. We find that municipalities where the mayor is affiliated with the coalition of the… CONTINUE READING
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