• Corpus ID: 158919308

Tying The Adversary's Hands: Provocation, Crisis Escalation, And Inadvertent War

  title={Tying The Adversary's Hands: Provocation, Crisis Escalation, And Inadvertent War},
  author={Hyunkag Cho},
Recent tensions on the Korean peninsula and in the South China Sea have led to concerns that provocative actions, such as harsh rhetoric and low-level violence, might embroil the United States in an unwanted war. The international relations literature, however, does not offer a coherent theory of provocation and crisis escalation. Instead, scholars and policymakers rely on intuition or other mechanisms of escalation, such as those based on accidents, threat perception, or imperfect signaling to… 

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