Two state disputes and outside intervention: the case of Nagorno–Karabakh conflict

@article{Harutyunyan2017TwoSD,
  title={Two state disputes and outside intervention: the case of Nagorno–Karabakh conflict},
  author={Ani Harutyunyan},
  journal={Eurasian Economic Review},
  year={2017},
  volume={7},
  pages={69-93}
}
  • A. Harutyunyan
  • Published 14 February 2017
  • Economics
  • Eurasian Economic Review
The paper proposes a game theoretical model of a dispute between two states. It analyzes the possible outcome of the dispute and the probability of war depending on the distribution of power between those states, the costs of fighting in the war and the level of uncertainty about each other’s costs. The paper also examines two types of outside intervention analyzing their separate and joint effect on the final outcome and the probability of war. The model is applied to the case of Nagorno… 
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