• Corpus ID: 13859034

Two sides of the same coin: Information processing style and reverse biases

  title={Two sides of the same coin: Information processing style and reverse biases},
  author={Shahar Ayal and Guy Hochman and Dan Zakay},
  journal={Judgment and Decision Making},
This paper examines the effect of information processing styles (indexed by the Rational-Experiential Inventory of Pacini & Epstein, 1999) on adherence to bias judgments, and particularly to reverse biases; i.e., when two choice questions that comprise identical normative components are set in different situations and yield seemingly opposite behavioral biases. We found consistent evidence for a negative correlation between rational score and adherence to reverse biases, as well as overall… 

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