Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?

@article{Barber2012TwoNC,
  title={Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?},
  author={Salvador Barber{\`a} and Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2012},
  volume={75},
  pages={490-509}
}
A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of de…nition. For the same reason, di¤erent conditions may be equivalent for functions de…ned on some domains, while di¤erent in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial issue in mechanism design. We illustrate this point by analyzing the role of di¤erent conditions that are always related, but not always equivalent to strategy-proofness. We de…ne two very natural conditions… CONTINUE READING
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