Two conceptions of subjective experience

@article{Sytsma2010TwoCO,
  title={Two conceptions of subjective experience},
  author={Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={2010},
  volume={151},
  pages={299-327}
}
Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is… 
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